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The Market Acceptance and Welfare Impacts of ‘Terminator’ Technology
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 11/24/06
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  45 lbs, FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,     
  51-52% Lean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 90-160 lbs.,
  Shorn, Midwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
   FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$91.15
134.78
119.87
151.02
55.61
56.40
66.30
86.00
246.78
$89.16
116.85
108.79
147.66
61.09
54.01
66.45
     *
250.77
$87.64
117.70
105.73
141.76
61.49
57.72
66.51
        *
252.36
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Columbus, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . .
* 
     
1.71
5.20
2.16
2.00
4.84
3.07
6.14
4.91
2.53
4.74
3.44
6.56
5.57
2.71
Hay
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
117.50
37.50
52.50
135.00
87.50
82.50
135.00
87.50
82.50
* No market.
An Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) system is
effective when infringers can be identified, successfully
sued for damages and deterred from further infringement.
The effectiveness of IPRs in plant varieties is limited due
to high detection costs of unauthorized use of seed that
embodies intellectual property (e.g., genetically modified
(GM) seed) and high enforcement costs. Seed companies
have traditionally performed limited research and
development (R&D) in self-pollinating plants mainly
because seed saving limits their ability to recoup their
investment.  1
Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (V-GURTs),
commonly referred to as ‘terminator’ technologies, are a
biological way of restricting the unauthorized use of newly
developed plant varieties through interference with
reproduction that results in the production of sterile seeds.
It has been argued that the introduction of ‘terminator’
technologies will encourage innovating firms to invest
more in R&D, and could result in increased agricultural
productivity through an increased degree of accuracy in
production (precision agriculture) as well as in crops with
better agro-ecological characteristics, as these technologies
could also be used as a tool that prevents the escape of
horizontal gene flow into neighboring crops or wild
species, limiting the potential negative environmental
effects of GM crops. 
At the same time, a number of countries (e.g., India,
Brazil), consumer groups and non-governmental
 Globally, the largest quantity of seed is produced by farmers;1
more than 75 percent of farmers, mainly in developing countries,
depend on saved seed as their primary seed source. Given that
farmers are spread all over and seed reproduces naturally,
monitoring the unauthorized use of seed by farmers becomes very
costly for seed providers.
organizations oppose the introduction of ‘terminator’
technologies, with the main criticism being that they are
unethical technologies that would deprive farmers of their
traditional right to save, use and exchange seeds, and
would jeopardize the independence and food security of
poor and small farmers.  An additional criticism of2
‘terminator’ technologies is that they would restrict access
to genetic resources and hinder the efforts of public
institutions and farmers to make new discoveries through
breeding, and would, therefore, foster the formation of
perpetual monopolies leading to an unequal distribution of
economic rents between farmers, seed companies and
consumers. Opposition also stems from concerns about the
environmental effects of gene flow from crops which are
sterilized and, according to the critics of the technology,
could in turn sterilize other plants and have serious effects
on the ecosystem. 
A recent study conducted in the Department of
Agricultural Economics at the University of
NebraskaSLincoln tries to shed light on the potential
market and welfare effects of the introduction of
‘terminator’ technologies. Specifically, the study examines
how the agronomic characteristics of a ‘terminator’ seed,
consumer perceptions and preferences regarding GM
technology, and producer cost structures and dependence
on saved seed affect the adoption of ‘terminator’
technology by producers, its market acceptance by
consumers and, consequently, the incentives of the biotech
sector to introduce the new technology. The analysis
examines the market effects of the introduction of
‘terminator’ technology in the U.S. market under the
current No-Labeling regime of GMPs. 
The results show that the market and welfare effects of
the introduction of ‘terminator’ technology depend on (1)
the level of consumer aversion to the GM technology, (2)
the shares of GM and ‘terminator’ technology (TT)
products in the total production of the non-labeled product,
(3) the price of the GM seed after the TT product is
introduced, (4) the price of ‘terminator’ seed, (5) the
agronomic characteristics of the ‘terminator’ seed relative
to GM and conventional seeds, and (6) the expected
penalty producers face when they cheat on their GM
licensing agreements. 
Specifically, the study shows that the greater the
agronomic benefits of the TT crop and/or the lower the
price of ‘terminator’ seed, the more likely it is that
producers with relatively low dependency on saving seed
will find it optimal to switch their production from the
conventional and the GM crop to the TT crop, and thus, the
more likely it is that the producers with both low and high
dependency on saving seed will experience welfare gains.
In addition, the lower the consumer aversion to genetic
modification and the lower the expected penalty producers
face when they cheat on their GM licensing agreements, the
greater the incentive of the biotech sector to introduce
‘terminator’ technology (as the greater are the profits that
can be captured).
The analysis shows that, in most cases, the introduction
of ‘terminator’ technology results in both winners and
losers. For instance, when the price of the non-labeled
product decreases due to the introduction of ‘terminator’
technology (this case emerges when the TT and the GM
product shares in the total production of the non-labeled
product either stay the same or increase compared to the
GM share under the status quo), consumers with low levels
of aversion to genetic modification experience welfare
gains, while consumers with high levels of aversion to
genetic modification experience welfare losses. Similarly,
producers with low dependency on saving seed, (who are
more likely to adopt the new technology), experience
welfare gains despite the decrease in the price of the non-
labeled product, while producers with high dependency on
saving seed experience welfare losses. 
While in many cases the introduction of ‘terminator’
technology creates winners and losers, there are certain
conditions under which all interest groups involved may
experience welfare gains. In particular, when consumer
aversion to ‘terminator’ technology is relatively low, the
agronomic benefits of the TT crop are high, and the
expected penalty producers face when they cheat on their
GM licensing agreements is low, the introduction of
‘terminator’ technology may be welfare-enhancing for
consumers, producers and the agricultural biotechnology
sector. 
Note: This article is based on Marianna Khachaturyan’s M.Sc.
thesis “The Market Acceptance and Welfare Impacts of
Genetic Use Restriction Technologies (GURTs)”
conducted in the Department of Agricultural Economics
at the University of NebraskaSLincoln.
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 The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity2
adopted a de facto moratorium on Terminator seeds in 2000, the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations is
against the use of terminator technology while the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) pledged
never to use any kind of terminator technology seeds. See
http://www.banterminator.org/takeaction/nationalcampaigns  for
countries with a national ban on terminator technology. 
